Abstract-This paper considers scenarios wherein a group of malicious vehicles on a highway perform a cooperative attack with the motive of creating undesirable wave effects among other vehicles on the highway. The two species of vehicles-malicious vehicles and normal vehicles, and their associated interaction effects-are modeled using partial differential equations. The malicious vehicles, which may be arbitrarily distributed on the highway, perform a sequence of velocity changes with the objective of making the density/velocity profile on the highway, track a reference profile. This reference profile (chosen by the malicious vehicles) has the property that once generated, it spontaneously evolves into a shock wave that propagates along the highway. Analytical expressions governing the velocity inputs of the malicious vehicles with which they can generate such waves are determined, for perfect as well as imperfect information scenarios. Simulation results are presented to validate the theory.
grid [2] , [3] , gas transmission and distribution networks [4] , large-scale process engineering plants [5] , [6] , water networks, unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), and automobiles [7] [8] [9] . As autonomous vehicles become prevalent in the connected transport infrastructure, it is possible that an attacker may try to hack the driving software of some of the vehicles, and thereby introduce undesirable effects on other vehicles on the highway [8] [9] [10] [11] .
This paper discusses one such scenario, wherein a group of malicious vehicles on a highway perform a cooperative attack with the motive of creating undesirable abrupt wave effects on other vehicles on the highway. More specifically, the malicious vehicles can perform a series of (subtle) velocity changes that will cause the density and velocity profiles of the nonmalicious (normal) vehicles to attain certain prespecified reference spatial distributions. These reference spatial velocity/density profiles can be so chosen by the malicious vehicles, that once formed, they subsequently evolve into undesirable effects such as shock waves, traffic jams, stop-and-go-traffic, etc. Shock waves are particularly undesirable because they can lead to multivehicle pile-up crashes.
This paper models and analyzes such attacks in a partial differential equation (PDE) framework. The use of PDE models for studying traffic flows has a fairly long history. The earliest such model was the Lighthill-Whitham-Richards (LWR) model [12] . The LWR model is basically a first-order hyperbolic PDE based on a gas dynamic-like continuity equation, which represents the conservation of cars on a highway. Subsequently, secondorder hyperbolic models have been developed, for example, the Payne-Whitham model [13] , in which the two dependent variables are density and average velocity of the vehicles. Prigogine and Herman [14] developed traffic flow equations based on the Boltzmann equation. These equations were further refined by Paveri-Fontana [15] . Based on Paveri-Fontana's equations, a second-order hyperbolic traffic model was defined in [16] . A distinguishing feature of the model in [16] is that it aptly captures the anisotropic behavior of traffic, that is, drivers largely react to the behavior of cars driving ahead of them, as opposed to those driving behind them. Gas dynamic-based two-species traffic models with the two species being cars and trucks have also been defined [16] , [17] . There have also been papers on analysis of stability in traffic flows [22] , [23] , and control methods for PDE traffic models [24] .
In this paper, we use the model in [16] , and within the framework of this model, assume two species of vehicles-namely, malicious and nonmalicious (normal) vehicles. The malicious vehicles may be arbitrarily interspersed among the nonmalicious vehicles, as schematically shown in Fig. 1 . Within this PDE framework, a controller is designed, by adopting which the malicious vehicles can create arbitrary velocity/density wave profiles on the highway, and these waves percolate through the nonmalicious vehicles. We show how the controller can be extended to represent cyber-attacks on a larger class of second-order traffic PDE models, and also in scenarios where the attacker has imperfect information of the traffic parameters. A preliminary version of this paper [25] focused purely on perfect information scenarios.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the single-species PDE traffic model [16] , and then demonstrates how this model can be extended to analyze a cyber-attack scenario. Section III describes the development of analytical control expressions for two cases: one in which the malicious vehicles generate velocity inputs to modify the spatial velocity profile on the highway, and another in which their generated velocity inputs modify the spatial density profile on the highway. Section IV shows how these malicious waves can be generated even when the attacker has imperfect information of the traffic parameters. Section V contains a discussion on the nature of the velocity/density profiles that the malicious vehicles seek to create. Section VI presents simulation results, while Section VII presents the conclusion.
II. PDE TRAFFIC MODEL

A. Single-Species Model
In this paper, we use a second-order macroscopic model proposed in [16] . The development of the model was inspired by earlier gas-kinetic-based models [14] , [15] . The macroscopic model has two independent variables x and t, where x ∈ [0, L] represents a spatial variable and t ∈ [0, ∞) represents time. The equations for the macroscopic model are
where, ρ(t, x) : R + × R → R represents the average density of vehicles (in vehicles/km/lane), and ρ(t, x) ∈ [0, ρ max ] where ρ max is the maximum possible density. V (t, x) : R + × R → R is the average velocity of the vehicles, and θ(t, x) : R + × R → R is the velocity variance in the region [x − dx/2, x + [16] . V eq (t, x) : R + × R → R represents the average equilibrium velocity and is given by
where V 0 is the average desired velocity, τ is the average relaxation time, and ρ a is the average density computed at the "interaction point." The interaction point x a is a reference point, as shown in Fig. 2 , ahead of the "average car" located at x at an instant of time. It is assumed that the average car at x speeds up or slows down depending on the behavior of the average car at x a . The interaction point is typically defined by x a = x + γ(l + V T ), where l = 1/ρ max is the average vehicle length, T is the average time headway, and γ ∈ [1, 3] represents an anticipation factor [16] . In (3), the factor P (ρ a ) accounts for the probability of overtaking, as well as the existence of a finite interaction-free space, and is defined as
As evident from (4), as ρ a approaches ρ max (that is, the number of vehicles increases), P (ρ a ) becomes progressively larger and this in turn makes V eq (t, x) in (3) smaller, that is, the equilibrium velocity decreases with increasing density. The B(δ v ) term, defined as [16] 
takes into account the anisotropic effects of the traffic flow, that is, the driver of a car responds more to the traffic ahead, than the traffic behind. In (5), the term δ v = (V − V a )/ √ θ + θ a is a dimensionless velocity difference between the average car at x and that at its interaction point x a . Terms V a and θ a denote the average velocity and velocity variance computed at the interaction point x a . In (3), V eq thus represents a balance between the desire of the average car at x to drive at its preferred speed V 0 and the slowing down effect it experiences due to its interaction with the average car at x a .
While we primarily utilize the above model [16] , the methods developed in this paper are applicable to a broader class of second-order traffic PDE models, comprising (1) and (6) . While (1) is a standard equation used for any traffic model, (2) represents a special case of a large class of PDE models (including, for example, [13] , [18] [19] [20] [21] among many others) with the following general structure:
where P represents the traffic pressure. For the model proposed in [16] , the traffic pressure is inferred based on empirical data as P = ρθ = ρA(ρ)V 2 , as given in (2).
B. Two-Species Model
The model in (1) and (2) is extended to a two-species model with subscripts M and N , as schematically shown in Fig. 1 . The dynamics of the proposed two-species model are
In (7)- (10), the average equilibrium velocities of the malicious and normal vehicles V eq M and V eq N are defined as follows:
In (11) and (12) , in general, B ij := B(δ v ,ij ), where
represents the dimensionless velocity difference between the vehicle at location x and the vehicle at interaction point x a , as shown in Fig. 2 . In (11), the equilibrium velocity V eq M of the malicious vehicles is given by the balance between the desires of the "average" malicious vehicle at x to drive at its preferred velocity V 0 M , and the slowing down effects it experiences due to the average malicious vehicle at x a , and the average normal vehicle at x a . A corresponding statement can be made for the equilibrium velocity V eq N of the normal vehicles. The effects of interaction between the two species are thus manifested in the V eq M and V eq N terms. The PDEs (8) and (10) essentially govern the spatio-temporal evolution of the velocities V N and V M to these equilibrium velocities V eq M and V eq N , respectively. As a footnote, we point out that interaction between the species can also occur via the pressure (through the velocity variance) term. However, the magnitude of the interaction through the pressure term is typically smaller when compared to the interaction through the equilibrium velocities, and is neglected in this paper. The variable P (ρ M , ρ N ) is defined as follows:
Therefore, the average equilibrium velocity of normal vehicles in (12) can be written as follows:
We see that V eq N is affine in V 0 M , and can be rewritten as
The term V 0 M thus influences the average equilibrium velocity of the normal vehicles, and may be viewed as a control input for the two-species model in (7)- (10).
III. REFERENCE TRACKING CONTROL
The objective is to vary (in space and time) the average velocity of the malicious vehicles in (9) and (10), which then can induce undesirable waves in the spatial velocity and density profiles of the normal vehicles in (7) and (8) . In other words, by performing these velocity modulations, the malicious vehicles force changes in the velocity and density profiles of the normal vehicles, till they are modified to track certain prespecified, 
A. Velocity Profile Manipulation
A Lyapunov-based control law is designed, using which the malicious vehicles can generate a malicious velocity profile on the highway. Toward this end, consider a Lyapunov functional Z V as follows:
where V r N represents the smooth bounded reference velocity profile that the malicious vehicles seek to create among the normal vehicles, and L represents the length of the highway under consideration. Based on the theory of Lyapunov functions [26] (7) into (8), and using (14), we arrive at
where α N can be inferred from (14) and (15), and F V N is
To attain the objective that V N tracks V r N , we take the time derivative of the Lyapunov function (16) , substitute (17) in this time derivative, and finally obtain the following equation:
where
then, the time derivative of the Lyapunov function is
With K v > 0 in (21), we have that
, which in turn means that the average velocity of the normal vehicles will globally exponentially track the reference velocity profile. (20) is a function of α N , and (14) and (15) (21), the more gradual the decay of Z V , and consequently, the more subtle the velocity changes required by the malicious vehicles to meet their objective. By proper choice of K v and time-varying reference V r N (t, x), it can be ensured that the generated velocity profile for the malicious vehicles is always physically feasible.
B. Density Profile Manipulation by the Malicious Vehicles
In this section, a control law is designed, using which the malicious vehicles can cause the density profile of the normal vehicles to track a predefined reference ρ r N (t, x). Define a Lyapunov function Z ρ as follows:
We seek to determine V 0 M (t, x) such that the time derivative of Z ρ is negative definite, as this will guarantee that the density of the normal vehicles ρ N (t, x) tracks ρ r N (t, x). The time derivative of (22) along the system trajectories (7)- (10) is
∂ t is as follows:
then, with a choice of K ρ > 0, the Lyapunov function (22) becomes a decreasing function of time, as desired. Substituting (24) into (7), and integrating with respect to x, we arrive at
where C is a constant of integration. Taking C = ρ N (t, 0)V N (t, 0), and substituting (25) into (8), we will get
where Q(t, x) in (26) is given by (14) and (15) into (26)
C. Velocity/Density Manipulation for General PDE Model
For the general form of the traffic PDE model defined by (1) and (6), a controller can be derived along similar lines. For density profile manipulation, defining Lyapunov function to be the same as in (22) , and considering different P N for different models, while assuming V eq N can be written as an affine function of V 0 M (that is, V 0 M has the structure of (15) but with a possibly different α N and β N ), the desired density profile can be achieved
where Q is defined as (27) . Along similar lines, the expression for V 0 M that will achieve the desired velocity profile in the general traffic model can be obtained.
IV. IMPERFECT INFORMATION SCENARIOS
In this section, we consider imperfect information scenarios, wherein the attacker does not have access to the values of traffic parameters, such as the relaxation time constant τ and average time headway T . These parameters are considered to be uncertain and are assumed to beτ andT for analysis. We analyze the possibilities of what can happen if the attacker uses valuesτ andT that are different from their respective true values τ and T , in both-the velocity profile manipulation, as well as density profile manipulation cases.
A. Velocity Profile Manipulation With Imperfect Information
When the attacker employs assumed valuesτ andT in the V 0 M of (20) , then the time derivative of (16) along the trajectories of (7)-(10) assumes the forṁ
where the term g V is as follows:
Since τ and T are positive scalars, it can be seen from (30) that as long asτ andT are positive, Z V remains stable when g V = 0. However, a nonzero g V may influence the asymptotic stability of Z V , that is, it may prevent Z V from asymptotically decaying to zero. This can happen under conditions that are determined as follows. It can be observed from (16) and (31) that when e v (t, 
In (32), [26] . Thus, as long as
is satisfied, the controller will guarantee that the reference velocity profile is tracked. Note that the upper bound in (33) is conservative. It is apparent from (33) that by increasing the value of K v , the upper bound on |g V | with which the exponential stability of (30) is guaranteed can be increased. However, too large a K v can require larger velocity changes to be performed by the malicious vehicles, which the attacker may not always desire, since it would make the attack less stealthy. When perfect information of τ and T is not available, the same can be determined by adding an adaptation law to the existing control laws, thereby creating an adaptive cyber-attack system. Toward this end, we ignore the effect of T on the B NN and B NM terms. This is justified because for those portions of the highway where the traffic is smooth, V ≈ V a , which makes B NN where β T N and α T N are both independent of τ and T . Using constants γ 1 > 0, γ 2 > 0, we define a Lyapunov function as
(35) The associated control law is updated to
. Then, by taking the time derivative of (35) and substituting V 0 M from (36), we arrive at
It can then be guaranteed that ∂Z V ∂ t < 0 if the terms in square brackets that multiplyw w andh τ are each made equal to zero. This can be achieved by definingḣ andẇ as follows:
Equations (36), (38), and (39), thus, represent adaptive laws that an attacker may use in imperfect information scenarios, and successfully achieve manipulation of the velocity profile.
B. Density Profile Manipulation With Imperfect Information
We now look at the effects of imperfect valuesτ andT on an attempt of the attacker to manipulate the highway density profile. Using these imperfect values in V 0 M of (28), the time derivative of (22) along the trajectories of (7)- (10) iṡ
where g ρ is as follows:
and the expressions forf w andf h are lengthy (and therefore omitted), but straightforward to derive. g ρ has the structure of a vanishing perturbation, that is, Z ρ = 0 ⇒ g ρ = 0. Doing an analysis similar to that performed in the preceding subsection, it can be shown that the attacker can still achieve exponential tracking of the density profile as long as g ρ satisfies
As before, the attacker can choose a larger value of K ρ to ensure that g ρ satisfies (42), but the larger K ρ may come at the expense of the malicious vehicles having to perform larger velocity changes, which the attacker may not desire. One may then define a modified Lyapunov functionZ ρ (t) similar toZ V (t) in (35), but with V N (t, x) and V r N (t, x) replaced by ρ N (t, x) and ρ r N (t, x), respectively. Correspondingly, the control law is modified as follows:
where Q is as given in (27) . Taking the time derivative ofZ ρ (t), and using (7), we arrive at
(44) Tracking error stability is guaranteed if ∂Z ρ ∂ t < 0 is achieved, and the same can be obtained by definingḣ andẇ as follows:
where we have made an assumption thatĥ andŵ both vary slowly with time. This can be ensured by choosing relatively large values of γ 1 and γ 2 , respectively. Equations (43) and (45), thus, represent adaptive laws that an attacker may use in imperfect information scenarios, and successfully achieve manipulation of the density profile.
C. Velocity/Density Manipulation for General PDE Model
In this section, the objective is to manipulate the velocity and density profiles of the normal vehicles, while using the general form of traffic model (1) and (6), assuming the attacker does not have access to the exact value of τ . We note that the general form of the PDE model does not include the T term. Assuming V eq N has the form of (15) , that is, V 
, and γ > 0 is a constant. Taking the derivative of (46) with respect to t and substituting V 0 M from (47), we arrive at
(48) Stability of the controller is guaranteed by definingτ aṡ
Equations (47) and (49), thus, represent an adaptive cyberattack system for velocity profile manipulation. For density manipulation, the modified Lyapunov function and control law arē
Taking the derivative of (50) with respect to t, and using (7) and (43), after some lengthy calculations, we eventually arrive at
By choosing γ large enough such thatτ changes slowly respect to time, it can be guaranteed that the density profile of the normal vehicles will track the reference density profile, that is, ∂Z ρ ∂ t < 0 ifτ is determined from the following adaptation law:
(53) Equations (51) and (53), thus, represent an adaptive cyber-attack system for density profile manipulation.
V. CHOICE OF REFERENCE VELOCITY AND DENSITY PROFILES
As mentioned earlier, the reference density and velocity profiles chosen by the malicious vehicles are such that once they [18] .
We consider the reference density profile qualitatively depicted in Fig. 3 , and quantified by the parameters ρ min , ρ max , x ρ min , and x ρ max . By appropriate selection of values of these parameters, a unique shock of the desired magnitude, speed, and location (at which it first forms) can be obtained. This is done using the method of characteristics.
Characteristic curves are specific curves on the x-t plane, along which the PDEs are transformed into ordinary differential equations. The single-species PDE model is rewritten as follows:
where denotes derivative with respect to u 1 . The eigenvalues of B(U ) define the slopes of the characteristic curves and are:
The system of two equations represented in (54) can be combined into a single second-order equation as follows:
where f (u 1 ) = (1 + A(u 1 ))/u 1 . To determine the relative effects of the different parameters, we write (57) in a nondimensional form. Toward this end, we definet 
Multiplying both sides of (58) by τ , the equation assumes the following structure:
where LHS represents the left-hand side of (58). Note that the coefficients of all the derivative terms in (58) are dimensionless, and thus provide a convenient way of determining the relative influence of the different parameters. It is evident that the coefficient of the second-order time derivative is − = 0.046, which is significantly smaller than unity. Using singular perturbation analysis, we can, therefore, surmise that the dynamics of (59) comprises of two time scales: a fast time scale during which the term LHS decays to zero, followed by a slower time scale during which time the dynamics of (57) can be well approximated by the following equation:
Equation (60) has a characteristic speed given by
. Since u 1 = ρ, we can see that the characteristic speed is a function of ρ. Thus, for an equilibrium velocity V eq as Fig. 4 . Characteristic velocity as a function of density.
follows [16] :
we can substitute (61) into (60), and then obtain a typical plot of the characteristic velocity λ as a function of ρ in Fig. 4 . Fig. 4 shows that there is a range of ρ for which λ > 0, and a range of ρ for which λ < 0. This trend is similar to that demonstrated by other equilibrium velocity profiles in the literature, and can be used to determine whether an initial condition develops into a shock or otherwise. For example, as seen from Fig. 4 , for ρ < 37.5, we have λ > 0, while for ρ > 37.5, we have λ < 0. Now consider a scenario wherein at a given time t 1 , ρ max (t 1 , x ρ m a x ) > 37.5, and ρ min (t 1 , x ρ m in ) < 37.5. Then, that portion of the density profile with ρ < 37.5 will travel forward (since λ > 0) along the highway, while that portion of the density profile with ρ > 37.5 will travel backward (since λ < 0). This will cause the density profile to become progressively steeper, eventually leading to a shock, which originates between x ρ m in and x ρ m a x . The exact location at which the shock first forms is readily determined as follows. At any given time t, the locations of the travelling wavefronts corresponding to ρ max and ρ min are given by
where t 1 represents the time at which the desired reference profile ρ r N (V r N ) has been achieved by the cyber-attack system. The shock starts at a time t 2 > t 1 , when x ρ m a x (t 2 ) = x ρ m in (t 2 ) is satisfied for some time t 2 . Therefore, we can find t 2 by equating (62) and (63), following which the shock formation location x ρ m a x (t 2 ) can be determined.
The other significant factor in choosing ρ min and ρ max is the velocity with which the shock travels, after it is formed. To calculate the shock speed, the generalized Rankine-Hugoniot shock condition is used, according to which, for a system represented in conservative form the shock, once formed, must necessarily satisfy the following equation:λ
where [X] denotes the magnitude of the discontinuous jump in the quantity X, andλ is the velocity of propagation of the shock.
Using (60) into (65), we arrive at
Using (66), a typical three-dimensional plot of the shock velocity as a function of ρ min and shock magnitude Δρ, where Δρ ≡ ρ max − ρ min , is given in Fig. 5 . From this figure, it is evident that the shock velocity is a function of the shock magnitude Δρ, and for around ρ min > 30, the shock moves backward irrespective of its magnitude. A malicious attacker can make use of Figs. 4 and 5 to determine the reference density/velocity profiles, as demonstrated in Section VI.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A highway stretch of length L = 10 km is considered, where the malicious vehicles intend to manipulate the shapes of the density/velocity profiles of the nonmalicious vehicles. Two simulations are presented: their objectives being to manipulate the density profile assuming perfect information, and the velocity profile assuming imperfect information, respectively. The parameters used in these simulations for the model (7)- (10) taking the plane corresponding to Δρ = 25, it can be observed that the shock velocity is negative if ρ min > 25. Hence, a ρ min is selected such that it satisfies 25 < ρ min < 37.5. Fig. 6(a) shows the initial and reference spatial density profiles of the normal vehicles, with the latter profile chosen based on the above objectives. We point out that while the controller drives the density profile from its initial condition to the continuous reference profile of Fig. 6(a) , the strong solution of the PDEs is valid since the shock has not yet been formed. After this reference profile is attained, the traffic then spontaneously evolves into a shock, and after this shock forms, the weak solution of the PDEs is applicable. Using the control law (28), this reference density profile is attained, as shown in Fig. 7. Fig. 8 shows the velocity changes performed by the malicious vehicles in order to achieve this objective.
Figs. 9 and 10 show the density profile of the malicious vehicles and the velocity profile of the normal vehicles, respectively. After the desired density profile is attained, it is assumed that the malicious vehicles exit the highway at around t 1 = 8 min. When this occurs, the space taken by the malicious vehicles is empty, thereby causing a decrease in the density of vehicles. This leads to an increase in the equilibrium velocity of the normal vehicles. This can be seen in Fig. 12 , wherein after the malicious vehicles have exited, the velocity of the normal vehicles V N increases for the next 36 s. For t > t 1 , even with the malicious vehicles no longer present, the intrinsic characteristics of the traffic cause this density gradient (as also the ensuing velocity gradient) to become progressively steeper and steeper, leading to a shock, which then propagates backward along the highway. This is seen in Figs. 11 and 12 .
B. Velocity Profile Manipulation With Imperfect Information
In this section, we show the effectiveness of the adaptive cyber-attack system derived in (36), (38), and (39) for imperfect information scenarios, wherein the attacker does not have access to exact values of T and τ . As before, the objective is to manipulate the velocity profile of the nonmalicious vehicles in such a way that the profile automatically evolves into a shock wave that propagates along the highway. The initial and reference velocity profiles are shown in Fig. 6(b) . The initial values ofT andτ are 0.8 s and 13 s, respectively. The adaptation weights for h and w are γ 1 = 10 16 and γ 2 = 10 3 , respectively, and the reasons for these values are as follows. It can be seen from Fig. 17 thatτ andT have some oscillations before they reach their steady-state (and true) values of 15 s and 1 s, respectively. These oscillations cause the derivativesτ andṪ to alternate between positive and negative values. Since γ 1 and γ 2 influenceτ andṪ [see (38) and (39)], it is important to choose them appropriately in order to ensure that the estimatesτ andT remain positive at all times.
As seen in Figs. 13-16 , the goal is attained, but with more oscillations in velocity and density. These oscillations occur because of the oscillations inτ , andT shown in Fig. 17 , which affect the decay rate of the Lyapunov functionZ V in (35). Finally, Fig. 18 shows the effect of varying K ρ and K v on the maximum velocity of the malicious vehicles, required to achieve the density/velocity profile manipulation. As is evident, reducing K ρ and K v can make the attack more stealthy.
Remark: This study can lay a foundation for devising potential countermeasures to such attacks. The types of density and velocity wave profiles that could exist in traffic for the time interval before the shock is actually formed are demonstrated. By monitoring the traffic for the onset of such density and velocity waves, warnings that such an attack is in progress can be triggered. Subsequently, personnel in the control room can initiate several countermeasures, such as modulating the traffic lights, giving advisories to the (normal) vehicles to adjust their speeds, and so on. Also, the analysis in this paper demonstrates one potential countermeasure which is to increase the relaxation time constant τ . When τ is large, a singular perturbation approximation is no longer valid for (59), and this physically means that the characteristic velocity will become different from that shown in Fig. 4 , thereby thwarting the intention of the attackers. Detailed development of such countermeasures is an avenue for future work.
VII. CONCLUSION
As autonomous vehicles become prevalent on highways, it is possible that an attacker may try to hack the driving software of some of the vehicles with malicious intent. The behavior of an automated highway traffic system under the influence of such malicious agents is analyzed using a two-species macroscopic model, with the two species being the malicious and the normal vehicles. The malicious vehicles are arbitrarily distributed among the normal vehicles, and seek to disrupt the traffic flow using subtle velocity changes that introduce undesirable wave effects in the traffic. Analytical control law expressions of the velocity changes of the malicious vehicles that generate a defined velocity/density profile on the highway are determined for perfect and imperfect information scenarios. The specific case of the malicious vehicles generating a reference velocity/density profile that subsequently evolves into a shock is demonstrated. This PDE-based analysis reveals the lack of resilience to the presence of malicious agents on automated highways, and calls for further research to develop suitable countermeasures.
